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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy Research Working Paper 4991
This paper is designed to help both the beneficiary 
governments and donors of aid-for-trade identify 
countries that are under-performing in trade and 
which are receiving less aid for trade than their global 
performance might otherwise suggest is necessary. The 
authors develop ten measures of trade performance 
and capacity (including trade-related infrastructure, 
institutions, and incentives) to assess potential demand, 
and then look at country allocations of aid for trade 
to see which are receiving below-average amounts in 
This paper—a product of the  International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network 
is part of a larger effort in the department to foster monitoring efforts of aid for trade. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at _egamberoni@worldbank.org 
and rnewfarmer@worldbank.org. 
the supply of aid for trade—relative to their potential 
demand. As they design national development strategies, 
countries may wish to consider giving greater attention 
to trade and requesting that donors allocate more aid 
for trade. As part of the analysis, the paper provides a 
conceptual framework for selecting indicators of trade 
performance and its policy determinants that the World 
Trade Organization and its partners might monitor 
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WTO Ministers during the Hong Kong ministerial emphasized the importance of Aid for 
Trade to improve the capacity of countries to participate in the world economy.  Indeed, 
while the overriding objective of the Doha round has been to create new opportunities for 
countries – particularly for low-income countries – to trade by reducing external barriers, 
ministers recognized that internal barriers might prevent countries from taking advantage of 
any new opportunities.  Internal constraints include economy-wide factors, such as 
macroeconomic instability, weak property rights, and underdeveloped financial systems. 
Other internal constraints are more specific to trade, including trade-related infrastructure, 
such as ports and transport, trade-related institutions such as customs or standards agencies, 
and incentives that through barriers at the border create price incentives that discourage 
trade.     
 
Clearly, policies and regulation determine the final outcome, but aid for trade can help 
governments sustain their agenda and pursue reforms. Moreover, the lessons of the aid 
effectiveness literature have to be kept in mind:  countries that need aid for trade but have a 
high probability of using it ineffectively (perhaps, say, because of excessive corruption, 
political instability, or an investment climate that discourages private activity, exports 
included) should not receive it.  
 
Governments can use donor-provided assistance – aid for trade – to help address the 
internal barriers and to improve their trade performance.  The ability of governments to 
avail themselves of aid for trade depends on the availability of overall amounts of 
assistance (the supply) and the decisions of governments, working with donors, to allocate 
available development assistance to trade-related problems instead of alternative -- and 
often no less urgent -- development problems (the demand).  The aggregate amount of aid 
for trade in a given year therefore does not lend itself to negotiation because it reflects the 
sum of all the allocation decisions of developing countries around the world.               
 
This paper brings together an analysis of both the supply and demand at the country level 
with two purposes in mind.  The first is to help both beneficiary governments of aid for 
trade and the donors identify countries that are under-performing in trade and which are 
receiving less aid for trade than their global performance might otherwise suggest is 
necessary.   The second is to single out a few indicators of trade performance and its 
determinants that the WTO and its partners might monitor closely as part of the aid for 
trade initiative.   
 
Specifically, we take up three questions: 
    
  Which countries might exhibit a potential demand for aid for trade, either because 
of poor relative performance in world markets or because of shortcomings in the 
supply-side determinants of trade -- infrastructure, institutions, and policy-induced 
incentives that hamper their trade performance?   
   4
  Which countries are receiving below average supply of aid for trade – relative to 
their potential demand?  
 
  Which indicators seem most useful for monitoring from a macro perspective aid for 
trade as measure by their predictive effects on trade performance and therefore 
country needs? 
 
In addressing these questions, the purpose is not to prescribe amounts for any country or to 
calculate an “optimal” amount of aid for trade.   Even a country whose trade performance 
or capacity might indicate a high potential demand for aid for trade may have other 
pressing needs that in fact are more important.  Rather, the objective is more limited:  it is 
to call attention to governments and donors as they sit down to draft national development 
programs that internal constraints to trade may be a problem, and that they may wish to 
consider seeking more aid for trade as part of the remedy.  Moreover, in identifying 
particular weaknesses the paper provides a rough indication of relative strengths and 
weaknesses in trade that governments might find helpful as they design strategies.  As such, 
this paper focuses on trade performance, trade capacity and policy, and aid for trade 
decisions – trying to bridge at the mezzo level both aggregate supply and country-level 
decisions. 
 
To that end, we discuss indicators of trade performance that might fit well with the WTO’s 
aid for trade monitoring effort.  Among the many indicators we have explored, we point out 
indicators of trade underperformance and indicators that seem to have the largest predictive 
power in explaining trade performance.  These variables may merit monitoring and 
reporting back to the WTO membership on a periodic basis.        
 
The paper begins by examining recent trade performance of developing countries over the 
last decade -- using five different measures as a prism to evaluate trade performance.  The 
second section tests various determinants of bilateral trade levels to hone in on capacity 
constraints – in infrastructure, institutions and policy --  that are most powerful in 
explaining trade patterns; it turns out five indicators of infrastructure, institutions, and 
policy are particularly influential in predicting trade bilateral levels, controlling for other 
factors.  A short third section then creates a measure of “potential demand” for aid for trade 
by identifying countries in the bottom quintiles in five indicators of trade performance and 
the five indicators of policy.   A final section examines the overall allocation of aid for 
trade allocation to determine which countries receive below average aid for trade, 
controlling for these variables, and whether those that have the highest potential demand 
are in fact receiving the most aid for trade.  In conclusion, we summarize the findings and 
offer some observations on indicators that might be included in the WTO’s monitoring 
exercise. 
 
1.  Trade Performance: Leading and Lagging Countries 
 
Real growth of exports 
 
Openness to trade is highly correlated with economic growth. Although the direction of 
causality is difficult to prove categorically, several studies support this relationship.  
Wacziarg and Welch (2008), perhaps the most recent study, finds that over the period 
1950-1998, on average, countries that liberalized their trade regime had 1.5 percent faster 
annual growth than in the pre-liberalization period. They find that average annual growth of 
per capita GDP for a liberalized country is about 2.7 percent compared to 1.5 percent for   5
countries that did not liberalize.  Moreover, countries with a liberalized trade regime 
accumulated capital at a rate 1.9 percent higher than non-liberalized regimes.  Because 
trade tends to lead to economic growth, and economic growth is indispensable for poverty 
reduction, aid for trade that helps countries that are under-performing in trade will 
contribute to poverty reduction.  
 
Trade performance represents thus the first dimension to look at in looking at the need for 
aid for trade. However, under-performance in trade could have many definitions.  In this 
section we look at five dimensions of trade performance.  The first is to simply look at the 
real growth rates of exports of goods and services over the last ten years.  The last ten years 
was a period of particularly extraordinary growth in the world economy, with growth in 
world exports in excess of 6 percent annually and rising strongly after the 2001 slowdown.  
Most countries did very well – and developing countries had growth rates that were on 
average 7.9 percent during this period.   Ranking countries by real export performance 
during this period shows that the top two quintiles performed substantially better than the 
rest (Figure 2).   
  
Box 1 Services trade is becoming the most important exports for certain countries. 
 
Services are becoming the major source of exports of a number of developing countries. In 
Fig.1, we show the example of Kenya, where exports of services overtook merchandise 
exports during the 90s.  The importance of services exports for certain countries requires a 


















However, analysis requires data, which is still very limited particularly for developing 
countries. In defining potential demand for Aid for Trade, we take into account services in 
the indicators of exports growth and change in market share. It remains a challenge to 




Thus, governments and donors might therefore look at their relative performance, and, if a 
country falls in the bottom two quintiles during this period, they may wish to explore the 
























Box Figure 1 Exports of goods and services from Kenya.  
U US S   $ $      m m. .                                       
Source: Bank staff from World Economic Outlook, United Nations COMTRADE   6
want to see if aid for trade could help improve performance.  So this is our first indicator




                                                 
2 While total exports of goods and services are available, more detailed trade data are absent. This prevented 
us from excluding the exports of oil and gas as major oil-exporter countries do not report such detailed level 
of exports in a systematic way.  However, excluding these countries that do not report detailed data and 
excluding oil and gas from the real exports growth leaves the regression results of the aid allocation (see 
section 3) almost unchanged (See Annex 3.2).    










































































Figure 2a Low income countries, real growth of exports of goods and services 
(1996-2006 Annual Average)  
 
Source: Authors calculation. World Bank, WTI 






































































Source: Authors calculation. World Bank, WTI 
Note: Quintile scale is from the entire sample of low (not shown) and middle income countries 
Figure 2b middle income countries, real growth of exports of goods and services  
(1996-2006 Annual Average)   8
Changing competitiveness 
 
A more sophisticated way to think about trade performance is to look at changes in 
underlying competitiveness of the exports of goods and services.  Export growth may prove 
illusory if a country’s exports are growing rapidly, but it is still losing market share to 
competing countries in the global market.  Looking at the change in global export market 
share therefore enables us to identify whether export performance is driven by the market 
or by the ability of exporters to compete in the market place.  In the period 1996-2006, 
despite a relatively robust performance of 9 percent, almost half of the LDCs and other 
low-income countries lost market share.  Similarly, between 1996-06, middle-income 
countries grew by 7 percent, but about one-third of middle income countries had a negative 
change in market share. This then is our second indicator. 
 
Underneath these changes in global market share are important undercurrents in specific 
markets.  For example, a country may improving its productivity – and hence its market 
share in its specific export markets – but selling products that are slow-growing in world 
markets or similarly selling into country markets abroad that are slow growing.  Or vice 
versa:  a country may be exporting hot-selling products to fast growing markets, thereby 
increasing its global markets, but in fact in these more narrow dynamic markets loosing 
market shares to other countries.  For example, Korea might be gaining global market 
share, but exporting computers to China – where it might be losing market share to 
Malaysia.   
 
This analysis therefore focuses on competitiveness in sales to existing markets (the 
intensive margin).  To distinguish among the different determinants, we use the Trade 
Performance Indicator of International Trade Center (ITC). The measure facilitates analysis 
of the sources of the inability to increase market share.  The measure decomposes the 
relative change in world market share into two elements:  
 
  A competitiveness effect in existing markets, which looks at the gains or losses of 
a country’s aggregate market share that would occur if changes were only due to 
variations in the country’s market share in its existing markets, regardless of the 
structure of the country’s exports. 
 
  A demand effect in existing export markets, which corresponds to gains or losses 
in a country’s aggregate market share that would occur if changes were only due to 
the dynamism of import markets.  This has two underlying structural components.  
First, the initial geographic specialization inherent in a country’s export portfolio at 
the beginning of the period. This captures the contribution to changing global 
market share associated with the dynamism of the countries that import its products 
– so, for example, if a country were exporting to fast-growing China during this 
period, it would score high.  The second component is the initial product 
specialization in that portfolio, which are the demand effects linked with a 
country’s initial sector specialization. If, for example, demand effect of initial 
geographic specialization is negative, it means the country is in effect exporting to 
slow growing markets; similarly, if the country’s initial sector specialization is 
negative, it means a country’s export portfolio is weighted toward products that are 
growing slowly.
3   
                                                 
3 The calculation also produces a residual which the ITC interprets as an adaption effect as shown in annex 
table 3.  This is the residual after controlling for the competitiveness and demand effects. It is negative if the   9
 
These effects are shown in the four quadrants of Figure 3, showing the changes in market 
share associated with improvements in competitiveness along the vertical axis and changes 
associated with demand effects along the horizontal axis.  Countries that lost 
competitiveness in existing markets and were selling in slow-growing markets – those in 
the lower left quadrant – are at severe risk of underperforming over the long run. These 
tended to be those countries that also had low overall export performance.  Conversely, 
those countries in the top right hand quadrant -- those that increased competitiveness in 
their existing markets and were selling to rapidly expanding markets -- performed 
exceptionally well are generally well positioned to take advantage of global trade.  
 
Bangladesh in the top left quadrant, for example, improved its competitiveness 
dramatically and this more than offset the dampening effects of being in slow growing 
product and geographic markets.  Several other countries suffered deteriorating 
competitiveness and were left in relatively slow growing markets.     
   
 
 
Thus, in addition to the first two indicators of trade performance (growth rate in exports 
and changes in global market share), we add changes in competitiveness in existing 
markets and demand structure.  Before adding all this up, we look at one more measure of 




                                                                                                                                                      
demand effect is negative and the competitiveness effect is positive or vice-versa.  It is positive if both the 
competitiveness and demand effect is positive or if both effects are negative.  
 
Competitiveness  ( change in market share) 
Demand (increase in 
market demand) 
Gaining competitiveness in slow growing 
markets: 
 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,  
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, 
Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Ghana, Haiti, India, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Laos, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique,  
Rwanda, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Is,  
Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Togo, Uzbekistan,  
Vanuatu, Viet Nam. 




Cape Verde, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Georgia, Myanmar. 
Losing competitiveness in 
fast growing markets: 
 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Yemen. 
Losing competitiveness in slow growing markets: 
 
Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central Afr. Rep., Côte d'Ivoire,  
Congo D. R., Dominica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, 
Moldova, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Sao Tome and 
P., Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tonga, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Source: Bank staff calculation based on ITC Trade Performance indicators. 
Fig. 3: Competitiveness effect versus demand effect (Average 1996-2006 annual change)  10
Countries Overly Reliant on a Few Products: Lack of Diversification 
 
Integration and the ability to compete in the global market ensure the gains from trade. 
However, greater integration in the global market place makes countries more vulnerable to 
sudden collapses in export prices or falls in demand – and this is a particular problem if the 
economy is dependent on only a few products. Moreover, it is not uncommon that these 
countries export commodities whose prices vary in common.  Concentration of exports is 
therefore an important dimension to take into account when identifying the demand for aid 
for trade.  
 
The extent of fragility of countries can be synthetically measured by the concentration of 
the export basket.  As shown by Jansen (2004), higher export concentration leads to larger 
terms of trade volatility since the change in the price of a product affect deeply the terms of 
trade. High volatility in the terms of trade, in turns has a negative impact on the income 
growth (see Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay, 2003).  This is particularly important for small 





Export concentration is not the only variables that define the fragility but it represents the 
dimension in which aid for trade can have a great impact. For example, as pointed out by 
Jansen (2004), improvement in infrastructure can allow countries to better compete in new 
product lines.  
 
The phenomena represent a distinctive feature of small vulnerable economies, for which 
aid for trade is an important resource of capitals given their low ability to access the 
financial markets. 
 
In summary, we have identified five indicators of trade performance that the literature has 
established are linked directly or indirectly to growth and poverty reductions – and which 
policy makers and donors might want to consider using aid for trade to address.  These are: 
 
  Growth rate of exports of goods and services 
Fig 4a Developiong countries 
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Fig 4b Developing countries  
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Source: Bank staff calculation   11
  Changes in global market share of goods and services 
  Changes in competitiveness in existing goods markets 
  The demand structure of exports of goods 
  The degree of concentration in the export portfolio.   
 
2.   Behind Poor Trade Performance:  Capacity Constraints 
 
Under-performance in export markets is symptomatic of domestic capacity constraints that 
aid for trade is designed to address.  Some constraints are economy wide and affect all 
aspects of domestic economic activity.  For example, insecurity and political fragility 
impede all investments (and we set aside fragile states in our analysis).  Also, countries 
with a poor investment climate induced by macroeconomic instability because high and 
volatile inflation depresses investment, or by unenforceable property rights that impede 
investors from earning a return.  Development assistance – though not necessarily aid for 
trade -- can at times help governments wishing to address these constraints. 
 
Trade-related capacities include: 
  infrastructure, particularly transport, ports, telecommunications, and information 
technology; 
   trade-related institutions such as customs and port management facilities; 
  incentives to export, particularly trade other policies that discourage private 
investment in exports and efficient import-substitution.  
Governments can use various types of aid for trade to overcome these obstacles.  
 
If it can be established that certain indicators of these capacity constraints are fairly robust 
in predicting poor trade performance, these variables ought to be high on the monitoring 
radar screen for those concerned about trade and growth – regardless of recent export 
performance.  
 
Trade-related infrastructure, institutions, and incentives determine trade 
 
Infrastructure, institutions and policy-induced price incentives are influential in 
determining trade flows – even controlling for economy-wide constraints.  Several studies 
have shown that behind-the-border barriers represent important obstacles to the ability to 
export and import. The literature has analyzed the impact of these barriers using gravity 
model of trade and looking at the main factors that restraint bilateral volume.
4  For 
example, Limao and Venables (1999) have shown that an improvement in transport and 
communication infrastructure from the median score on surveys to the highest 25th 
percentile is associated with a decrease in transport costs by 12 percentage
 points and an 
increase in trade volumes of 28 percent.
5 Additionally, they show that landlocked countries 
face higher transport cost since their ability to transport goods depends also on the 
infrastructure endowment of the transit countries. Indeed, it is worthwhile to note that about 
a third of least developed countries are landlocked. For example, in East Africa, goods 
bound for landlocked countries face the time equivalent of at least three clearance 
                                                 
4 The gravity model provides a way of measuring bilateral trade flows among trading partners. The first 
gravity equation simply equated the volume of trade to the product of the exporting and importing countries’ 
GDP and the distance between the two.  
5 Their infrastructure indicator is based on four components: the density of rail road per square km, the 
density of road and of paved road per square km and the number of telephone mainlines per capita.  The 
indicator has been widely used by other researchers to proxy for the quality of infrastructure cost and thus, the 
cost of transport and communication (See Carrere, 2006).   12
processes of coastal countries. Arvis, Raballand and Marteau (2007) explain the reason 
behind these higher costs by providing a micro analysis of the different costs associated 
with being landlocked. Based on the supply chain model, the authors use micro-data and to 
identify the cost of being landlocked along three dimensions: (i) transport costs, (ii) 
logistics costs and (iii) hedging costs incurred by shippers to cope with unpredictable 
delivery schedules. The study highlights several examples of the higher cost associated 
with being landlocked.  Piermartini and Nordas (2004) augment the Limao and Venables 
(1998) indicator with the quality of ports, the density of airports with paved railways, and 
the density of internet users and of mobile phone subscribers. They show that port 
infrastructure matters for all sectors, while timeliness and access to telecommunication 
matter more in the clothing and automotive sector.   
Institutions also matter.  Mann, Otsuky and Wilson (2003) provide an estimate of the gains 
in terms of trade volume associated with improvements in port efficiency, customs and 
greater electronic-business and the regulatory environment.  They look at the trade flow 
among the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation members and they show that bringing 
below average APEC member capacity halfway to the average for all members, intra-
APEC trade could increase by US$254 billion suggesting an increase in APEC average per 
capita GDP of 4.3 percent. Improvements in port efficiency and customs environment, that 
is across the border barriers, represents about $117 billion of the total gain while reducing 
"inside the border" barriers would lead to gains of around $116 billion. The quality of 
institutions can also be capture by the time required to exports. The inability of exporting in 
time, restrain the possibility of countries to take part in the offshoring of production as time 
delays affect just in time production (see Nordas, 2005). Said differently, as shown by 
Djankov, Freund and Pham (2006), an additional day required for exporting is equivalent to 
being 70 km far away from the trade partner.     
Putting infrastructure and institutions together, Francois and Manchin (2006) look at a large 
sample of countries in the period 1988-2002. They proxy transport and communication 
costs with the percentage of paved roads of total roads, on the number of fixed and mobile 
telephone subscribers (per 1,000 people), on the number of telephone mainlines (per 1,000 
people), on telephone mainlines in largest city (per 1,000 people), telephone mainlines per 
employee, mobile phones (per 1,000 people), and freight of air transport.  Additionally, 
they introduce an institutional variables which reflects the size of government: 
expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; the legal structure and protection of property rights; 
the access to sound money: inflation rate, possibility to own foreign currency bank 
accounts; freedom to trade internationally: taxes on international trade, regulatory trade 
barriers, capital market controls, difference between official exchange rate and black 
market rate, etc.; and the regulation of credit, labor, and business. They show that both 
infrastructure and institutions matter for both trade volume and the probability that trade 
occurs. Additionally, they show that North-South Trade is more affected by infrastructure 
quality and institution than protection imposed by the North countries on South imports. In 
line with this finding, Hoeckman and Nicita (2008) show that even if tariffs and non tariff 
measures still restrain the ability of developing country to serve the global marketplace, 
trade facilitation measures explain trade volume the most. Additionally, the authors show 
that reducing internal trade cost has an effect similar to reducing traditional trade 
restrictions associated with tariffs and NTMs.  
 
Finally, incentives arising from the trade regime that guide private investment into exports 
or efficient import-substitution industries are no less important.  Border barriers stemming 
from trade policy can define the ability of firms to compete in the market. Import tariffs   13
create an incentive for firms to invest in local industry rather than in export industries.  If 
tariffs are high, reducing them can lead to productivity gains.  Amiti and Koning (2007) 
have shown that 10 percent fall in tariff is associated with a productivity gain of 1 percent. 
Additionally, the authors have shown that reduction on tariffs of imported inputs leads to 
bigger productivity gains:  a reduction on input tariff of 10 percentage points leads to an 11 
percent productivity gain for importing firms. Indeed, lower inputs tariffs allow firms to 




Trade policy regimes do not only consist of tariffs.  Fixed cost to entry in the foreign 
market dictates the ability of firms to exports. Moreover, high fixed to serve the importing 
market impair the pro-competition process in the importing country. Greater competition 
drives the least productive firms out of the market and increase the average productivity of 
the country (Melitz, 2002).  
Indicators of capacity constraints that predict trade performance 
What indicators are most useful in predicting low levels of trade?  We conducted a “gravity 
model” analysis with the objective of identifying key indicators of underperformance in 
bilateral trade (see Annex 3).  The simple idea underlying the analysis is that distance from 
markets, market size and growth rate should influence the scale of bilateral trade.  So 
Guatemala, as a small country relatively close to the large market of the US, should sell 
more to that market, controlling for other factors, than to an equally large market that is far 
away, say Europe; likewise, it should sell a much smaller amount to Peru because that 
market is much smaller and even less to Argentina because that market is far away. By 
comparing all bilateral trade between a developing country and its partners, the analysis can 
determine who is trading above average or below average, controlling for economic size 
and remoteness, and what are the indicators of infrastructure, institutions, and incentives 
that explain most consistently under- and over-performance.     
One limitation of this analysis is that the data do not include services.  This is particularly 
problematic for countries that may be shifting their comparative advantage from 
merchandise exports to services exports.  
The model and indicators 
The analysis here uses cross-sectional data for 2006.  This analysis looks at the expected 
level of bilateral trade between developing countries and all their trading partners, given the 
relative size of markets, growth rates, distance separating exporter from importers and 
indicators of infrastructure, institutions and policy.  So beside distance and market size, we 
also included other predictors of trade levels – including market access through 
membership in a free trade agreement, former colonial relationships, and language 
commonalities.  The dependent variable in all cases was the level of trade between country 
pairs.  
The purpose of this exercise was to search for indicators of capacity that would have the 
“weightiest” predictive power in the cross section on trade levels.  After experimentation 
with various measures, we settled on five: 
                                                 
6 Even conceptually, economists have long known that a tariff on imports is equivalent to an export tax since 
the effect on relative price is the same (Lerner, 1936).      14
  For infrastructure, the transport component of the World Bank’s Logistic 
Performance Indicator
7 had the greatest power in explaining differences between 
low trade volumes and high trade volumes for any two countries, controlling for 
other factors.  Since the LPI did not come into existence before 2006, it is worth 
noting that LPI is highly correlated with other indices of infrastructure.
8  
  For institutions, we found two measures to have a powerful explanatory effect on 
trade levels: First, the customs component of the LPI and, second, the time it takes 
to convey and process exports through customs to ship, taken from the Doing 
Business database
9 also performed well, but are less trade specific. 
  For trade policy-induced incentives, the objective was to capture the effects of 
border policies on biasing private investment in favor of particular import-
substitution industries in an inefficient manner and away from exports.  We used 
two measures: The first was the percentage of tariff lines covered by tariff peaks 
(see Annex 2).  The second was the tariff trade restrictiveness index of the World 
Bank, which measures the level of protection adopted by importing countries on 
bilateral exports.  
These five measures, together with the control variables, have strong effects on increasing 
export performance.
10  Figure 5 illustrates the various effects of selected components of the 
gravity model.  The center line in effect is the average level of trade between any two 
countries. If the quality of infrastructure were to improve by 1 percent (as measured in our 
indicator), exports would increase by more than 4 percent. Delays in exporting and trade 
restrictiveness along with distance diminish exports by substantial amounts.  This reveals 
the impact of reforms.  If the number of days to export could be reduced by 1 percent, 
exports on average would increase by more than 1.5 percent.  Said differently, reducing 
time to exports by one day leads to 3.5 percent which is similar to a 1 percent decrease in 
the trade restrictiveness index. Additionally, a reduction of the exporter share of tariff lines 
subject to tariff peak by 10 percent raises exports by around 2 percent.  And among the 
control variables, if the GDP of a country’s trading partner increases by 1 percent, this 
increases the average country’s exports by 1.5 percent.    
                                                 
7The World Bank recently created this comprehensive indicator for trade facilitations called the Logistic 
Performance Indicator.  It summarizes the logistic performance along seven areas: (1) the efficiency of the 
clearance process by customs and other border agencies, (2) the quality of transport and information 
technology infrastructure for logistics, (3) the ease and affordability of arranging international shipments, (4) 
the competence of the local logistics industry, (5) the ability to track and trace international shipments, (6) the 
domestic logistics costs and (7) the timeliness of shipments in reaching destination. 
8  One commonly used indicator, for example, is that created by Limao and Venables (1999) that uses density 
of rail and roads, share of paved roads, and telecommunications per capita.  For example, the overall LPI 
correlates 0.79 with the quality of the quality of port infrastructure as proxy by the World Competitiveness 
yearbook, IMD Lausanne, 0.7061 with the number of internet users per 1000 inhabitants, 0.5645   with the 
density of paved road and -0.6114 with the Limao and Venables indicator. Note that a higher value of the 
Limao and Venables indicator implies worse infrastructure. 
9 The measure if reflected in a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when both the importing and 
exporting country have a cost to enforce the contract below the median.  
10 See annex 3– for the cross sectional regression analysis and its explanation.    15
 
Reforms benefit neighbors 
It is important to note that reforms in one trading country have positive synergistic effects 
on its partner.  If Kenya improves its customs border crossings and ports, Uganda and 
Tanzania will benefit.  In effect, lowering trade costs through institutional reforms is, much 
like reductions in tariffs that provide market access, is a “global public good” that benefits 
both the reforming country and its trading partners.   
Needless to say, infrastructure and institutions in low income countries are significantly 
less developed than middle income countries.  Figure 6, for example, shows that about 60 
percent of LDCS score in the lowest two quintiles of the ranking (i.e., in the lowest 40 
percent of the sample of all developing countries), and therefore have greater needs to 
improve their transport and information technology.  Less than 20 percent of middle 
income countries have infrastructure and information technology scores in the lowest two 
quintiles.  Among LDCs in the bottom quintiles are: Afghanistan, Djibouti, Myanmar, 
Niger, Nepal, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Chad, Timor-Leste and Tanzania.   
Among the low income countries: Armenia, Guyana, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  














time for export/ import
Quality of transp. and IT
Change in exports % 
Fig 5: Determinants of trade: Effects of 1% change in infrastructure, institution, and incentive on 
exports.  
(Change in exports relative to the average country in the sample) 
Note: Marginal effects calculated at the average of the sample.  
a represents the change passing from zero to one.  The rest of 
the variables refer to change of 1 percentage point. 
bOther control variables are listed in the Annex.  The regressions with the 
major number of observations have been used to define the marginal effects of a variable that appears in different 
regressions. The variable “barriers abroad” represents the bilateral Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) that the exporter 












                             
 
 
Improving the policy and institutional variables captured in these measures would have a 
profound impact on trade.  For example, improving policies so as to raise a country’s score 
from the fourth to third quintile of the customs indicator would increases trade by 31.5 
percent, keeping everything else at its mean. By the same token passing from the fourth to 
the third quintile in terms of quality of transport and IT raise trade by 35 percent.   
If the indicators for infrastructure, institutions, and trade policy related incentives predict 
reliably trade performance, countries with low scores on these indicators ought to be among 
the strongest candidates for aid for trade.  Said differently, as they discuss aid allocations in 
the PRSP process, donors and countries desirous of harnessing the global economy for their 
growth and poverty reduction should pay special attention to the policies and institutions 
that shape their scores – because these heavily predict trade performance.  Aid for trade can 
act as a catalyst to improve these policies and institutions.  
 
3.  Gauging Potential Demand for Aid for Trade  
 
So far we have presented here two reasons why countries might need aid for trade, namely 
poor trade performance and relatively low capacity to trade.  These can be taken to be 
indicators of countries’ potential demand for aid for trade
11.   To gauge trade performance, 
countries that are potential users of aid for trade are those with: 
 
  Low or negative growth rates of exports of goods and services; 
  Shrinking shares of the global market for goods and services; 
  Deteriorating competitiveness performance in existing markets; 
  Export sales concentrated in product or geographic markets; 
  Dependences on a relatively few products its overall exports – lack of 
diversifications 
 
To gauge internal capacity limitations, we have seen it is countries with:   
 
  poor infrastructure (LPI – transport and quality of IT) 
  poor customs  
  and poor trade-related institutions generally  
  disincentives to export because of high tariff peaks 
                                                 
11 In building the demand for aid for trade, we abstained from judgments on the aid effectiveness. At this 
stage, we are not interested in knowing which countries should receive more aid for trade given their sound 
track record of policy and reforms. In contrast, we are interested in knowing which countries ares facing the 
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fifth quintile  17
  and disincentives from poor trade policy (tariff peaks and Trade Restrictiveness 
Index) 
 
Since those most in need of aid for trade are those toward the bottom of rankings in the 10 
areas, we created a simplistic scale to gauge potential demand for aid for trade:  If a country 
were in the bottom quintile of a variable, it received a five; if it were in the next lowest 
quintile, it received a “four”; and so on.  We located every country in its respective quintile 
on each of the 10 indicators of performance and capacity.  If a country was in the bottom 
quintile (a score of 5) in all 10 indicators, it would receive a maximum score of 50.  
Conversely, the best performers with the best capacity would receive of score of 10 (top 
quintile score of 1 in a sum of 10 indicators).  
 
Simply adding a country’s total scores gives some proximate indication of the potential 
demand for aid for trade.  Note that we have given equal weight to all 10 indexes.  An 
argument could be made for giving greater emphasis to one or another measure.  This is 
especially true for a given country; a country might score low on one index, say, 
diversification, but high in export growth, and the government might decide that it 
diversification is a high policy priority. This paper avoids those judgments and opts for an 
unweighted approach
12.      
 
The countries with the strongest potential demand by this measure are shown in Figure 8.  
Most are LDCs and other low-income countries, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Congo DR, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Nepal, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Is, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe (Figure 8).  
                                                 
12 In appendix 3.4 we show the correlation of the various components of the overall indicator. The highest 
correlation is between the quality of transport and efficiency of customs (0.72) followed by the correlation 
between the herfindhal index of export concerntration and the time to export (0.58). Among the performance 
components the highest degree of correlation is between export growth and change in market share (0.48), 
followed by the correlation between export growth and the competitiveness component of the market share 
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Source: Authors calculation based on data from ITC and World Bank. 
Figure 8: Potential demand for Aid for Trade. 
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Box 2 Overall trends in Aid for Trade 
 
According to the 2008 definition of the OECD, aid for trade comprised about 25 percent of total 
development assistance and about 30 percent of aid that donors and governments allocated to particular 
sectors.  This “sectoral allocable aid” excludes fund for debt relief, administrative costs and budget 
support.  The OECD definition is a rather broad measure of aid for trade because it comprises all 
investments in infrastructure except water and sanitation, arguably necessary since it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish whether a power plant serves the tradeable or nontradeable sectors.   
 
Aid for trade has fallen steadily as a share of sector allocable aid and total development assistance in 
every year since 1996 (Figure 9).  Aid for trade represented the 50 percent of total sector allocable aid in 
1996 to about 30 percent in 2006.   In fact, trends in aid for trade declined in absolute terms to 2002, but 
have since risen slightly, perhaps associated with renewed donor interest in growth and in worldwide 
concerns for trade associated with the launch of the Doha Development round. Aid for trade 
commitments increased in recent years to a peak in 2004, where it has apparently plateaued at about 
about US$20 billion.  Even so, this recovery has not kept pace with either total development assistance 
nor that portion allocated to particular activities.     
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aid for trade
Official assistance evolution (2005 constant price)
 
 
Note that these data, following DAC standard practice, exclude nonconcessional multilateral and 
bilateral lending.  Nonetheless, the pattern would probably hold even if these numbers could be included 
in the analysis.        
 
While much of the discussion in the Doha rounds has concerned additionality, evidence suggests that aid 
for trade is unlikely to increase unless donor expands overall supply of aid.  Historically, aid for trade 
has expanded in tandem with overall sector allocable aid, if a slower pace. For every dollar spent on 
total aid sector allocation, aid for trade commitments amount at USD 0.12 on average. In 2004, the aid 
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4.  Supply of Aid for Trade:  Who Gets Aid for Trade and Why? 
  
So are the countries with the highest potential demand the ones that receive the most aid for 
trade?   Can we identify countries that received below-average aid for trade, controlling for 
the major determinants, despite substantial needs?   
 
By way of preface, the lessons of the aid effectiveness literature have to be kept in mind:  
countries that need aid for trade but have a high probability of using it ineffectively 
(perhaps, say, because of excessive corruption, political instability, or an investment 
climate that discourages all private activity, exports included) should not receive it.  
Zimbabwe at the moment is one such country – as high inflation and political stalemate 
mean the resources directed at any form of development assistance are likely to be wasted 
if not counterproductive.
13  For these reasons, we include a measure of aid effectiveness. 
 
Box 3 Bilaterals lead in overall amounts, but lag in amounts to the poorest countries  
 
Bilateral donors, here including the European Commission as one country, tend more aid for trade in 
absolute term than multilateral donors. Leading countries include Japan, the US and the EC.  
 
However, bilateral governments tend to give a greater share to the middle income countries. Bilateral 
donors gave on average 52 percent of the aid for trade to middle income countries and 48 percent to low-
income and least developed countries.  For their part, multilateral donors devote a larger share to low-
income and least developed countries – roughly 85 percent of their total aid for trade portfolio. Least 
developed countries received about a half of the multilateral donor total portfolio.  
 





ldc middle income countries
other low income countries
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13 To be sure, countries with these characteristics are precisely the ones that often need external assistance the 
most; for that reason, aid practitioners often try to consider the potential for policy improvements and disburse 
against that potential for improvement rather than the actual state of affairs.  In these cases, indicators of aid 
effectiveness, since they are inherently retrospective, can have little value in turn around situations where new 
commitments are forward looking and often involve subjective bets on new country leadership.  That said, 
these tend to be a small minority of cases in any given year, and so we opt to include indicators of aid 
effectiveness. 
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Is potential demand for aid for trade matched by supply? 
 
To assess whether those with highest potential demand for aid for trade are those that 
receive it, we look at aid for trade commitments (as a share of recipient GDP), controlling 
for per capita income and a proxy for “aid effectiveness” and our “potential demand” score.  
(Since the aid effectiveness literature suggests aid allocation should correspond to legal 
systems that enforce contracts and minimize corruption, we have used the Kaufman-Kraay 
“rule of law indicator”
 14.)      
 
In fact, there is good news.   Controlling for the factors, countries with the greatest 
potential demand are those that in general need it the most.  Figure 11 shows the 
relationship between potential demand and aid for trade as a share of GDP, controlling for 
GDP per capita and rule of law.  When we add individually our capacity measures for 
infrastructure, institutions, and incentives, these variables too have explanatory power.  In 
2006, for example, on average, donors committed higher amount of aid per GDP to 
countries with better quality of the legal system, lower logistic performance and lower GDP 
































































































Demand for Aid for Trade
Source: Authors calculation, based on 2006 cross-section regression
controlling for the quality of the legal system and per capita GDP
Fig 11 Supply versus demand for aid for trade in 2006 for low income countries
 
 
Even though aid for trade correlates broadly with potential demand the match is not perfect 
– so some countries receive far less aid for trade than their potential demand would 
otherwise indicate.  Several countries whose scores in trade performance and capacity 
                                                 
14 Replacing the rule of law of Kaufman with other variables, like the control of corruption or the trade 
component of the CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) gives similar results. Using the control 
of corruption variable, Central African Republic and St. Kitts and Nevis do not appear anymore in the list 
while Costa Rica, Croatia, Lebanon and Madagascar appear to have received below average aid for trade. 
Using the trade component of the CPIA, the Dominican Republic, Myanmar and St. Kitts and Nevis exit the 
list while Cameroon, Tajikistan and Uganda appear to have received below average aid for trade in the period 
1996-2006.  
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would otherwise indicate they should receive large amounts of aid for trade in fact 
receive below average amounts. The low income countries that are receiving below average 
aid for trade are shown below the line in Figure 11. Among low income developing 
countries receiving below average aid for trade, there are:  Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Chad, Congo DR, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, 
Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. 
 
Middle-income countries (not shown in Figure 11) that, should they be eligible and it be 
warranted, that receive less per capita aid for trade include:  Argentina, Belarus, Botswana, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, India, Iran, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, South Africa, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela).  Some of these are more statistical 
aberrations (say China because of its large GDP); other receive low levels of development 
assistance generally. 
 
We made the calculation a second way – this time using time series data
15.  Specially, we 
look at the aid allocation for the period 1996-2006. We use GDP per capita, rule of law, the 
export growth in goods and services, the share of tariff peak and the Limao and Venables 
(1999) indicator.  In the period under consideration, on average, donors still have allocated 
more aid for trade to countries with lower GDP per capita, worse infrastructure. However, 
controlling for these variables, developing countries that on average received below 
average commitments relative to their potential demand appeared to be:  Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo DR, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Sudan, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen. Half of these countries are 




While the overall trade performance of developing countries has been remarkable – indeed 
unprecedented – in the last half decade, several countries have not yet fully harnessed the 
global economy to their development goals.   Moreover, several economies are at risk that 
the prospect of a slowdown in the global economy will severely erode recent gains as less 
efficient suppliers to the global market are driven out.  For these reasons, focusing the 
attention of governments on strategies to improve their competitiveness and on mobilizing 
aid for trade is increasingly urgent.  
 
It is worth reiterating that the results of our analysis that identifies countries warranting 
more aid for trade are meant to provoke a discussion -- within governments and between 
governments and donors – not to imply a specific aid for trade solution.  One reason for 
humility is that governments have other pressing priorities and these are not considered in 
our discussion.  Another is that some problems do not require much aid for trade to resolve 
– problems stemming from distorted trade regimes can be solved with a stroke of a pen or 
perhaps a small TA project, so our aggregate supply and demand calculations would not 
apply.  Nonetheless, in the aggregate, our view is that governments and donors have 
                                                 
15 In the panel, countries receiving below average are identify by looking at the fixed effect.    23
considerable scope for increasing aid for trade, especially among the under-performing 
and under-served low-income countries.     
 
Indicators of under-performance in trade 
 
These countries are those that are in the lower two quintiles of performance measured along 
five dimensions:  those experiencing relatively slow growth of exports of goods and 
services, those losing global market share, those suffering deterioration in competitiveness 
in existing markets, those exporting slow-growing products or to slow-growing markets, 
and/or those over-reliant on only a few exports.  Within the lowest overall quintiles of 
performers, some countries score very low in certain areas but higher in others; this would 
point to areas where policymakers and their advisors might want to devote efforts for 
improvement in overall performance.  Annex Table 1.2 is suggestive of areas that 
governments wishing to harness the global economic might want to make initial 
investments in policy improvements.  
 
For example, countries that have increased their competitiveness in existing markets, but 
experienced slower-than-average growth because their main geographic markets were 
growing slowly, might well want to use export promotion agencies to help producers begin 
selling in faster-growing geographic markets.       
 
Indicators of policy – infrastructure, institutions, and border protections 
 
Measures of trade-related infrastructure, institutions, and border protection also presage 
lower than average levels of trade.  Those likely to under-trade with bilateral partners, 
controlling for market size and distance, among other things, are those with low levels 
scores on the logistics performance index for transport (or, alternatively, the Limao-
Venables infrastructure index), the logistics performance indicators for customs, and an 
indicator of peak tariffs.  
 
Aid for trade can provide assistance in improving these scores.  The good news arising 
from this paper is that indicators of potential demand correlate broadly with ratios of aid for 
trade to GDP of beneficiaries.  Nonetheless, several countries that have the highest 
potential demand experience lower-than-average levels of aid for trade.  Donors and 
governments in these countries that are in the process of designing growth and poverty 
reduction strategies ought to consider shifting additional development assistance into aid 
for trade.          
 
Two corollaries are important to underscore: The first is that improvements in the scores of 
one country benefit its trading partners, a fact strongly evident in the analysis. In this sense, 
aid for trade has some of the characteristics of a public good – providing support to reforms 
in one country that have positive effects on their trading partners .    
 
Indicators Worthy of Continued Monitoring 
 
The second is that the ten indicators this paper employs offer considerable promise for the   
WTO’s monitoring efforts.  While other indicators could as readily be selected, the ones 
identified in this paper either provide a penetrating understanding of performance-related 
problems or have powerful effects in determining future trade performance, both elements 
important to the WTO monitoring exercise.  
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ANNEX 1  
 










Gabon -2.97 5 
Malawi -2.77 5 
Comoros -1.87 5 
Venezuela -1.62 5 
Jamaica -0.54 5 
Papua New Guinea  -0.38 5 
Paraguay -0.26 5 
Guyana 0.61 5 
Guinea 0.81 5 
Yemen 0.85 5 
Senegal 0.87 5 
Vanuatu 1.17 5 
Zimbabwe 1.17 5 
Benin 1.37 5 
Eritrea 1.61 5 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  1.71 5 
Djibouti 1.93 5 
Fiji 1.95 5 
Central African Republic  2.03 5 
Dominica 2.19 5 
Guatemala 2.60 5 
Kyrgyzstan 2.80 5 
Samoa 2.89 5 
Panama 2.92 5 
Saint Lucia  3.05 4 
Nigeria 3.38 4 
Algeria 3.60 4 
Kenya 3.70 4 
Togo 3.75 4 
Uzbekistan 3.89 4 
namibia 3.96 4 
Honduras 4.06 4 
Tunisia 4.23 4 
Mauritius 4.39 4 
South Africa  4.46 4 
Madagascar 4.59 4 
Dominican Republic  4.60 4 
Swaziland 4.62 4 
Cameroon 4.83 4 
Ecuador 4.85 4 
Jordan 5.02 4 
Ukraine 5.15 4 
Niger 5.31 4 
Sierra Leone  5.42 4 
Gambia 5.43 4 
Colombia 5.46 4 
Congo 5.46 4 
Kazakhstan 5.61 4   26
Uruguay 5.61 3 
Tajikistan 5.69 3 
Sri Lanka  5.71 3 
Macedonia 5.74 3 
Syria 5.91 3 
Indonesia 5.96 3 
Côte d'Ivoire  6.09 3 
Botswana 6.12 3 
Philippines 6.24 3 
Tanzania 6.37 3 
Morocco 6.46 3 
Pakistan 6.49 3 
Nepal 6.51 3 
Croatia 6.53 3 
Argentina 6.61 3 
Bolivia 6.64 3 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  6.68 3 
Thailand 6.71 3 
Chile 6.85 3 
Malaysia 7.13 3 
Burkina Faso  7.27 3 
Iran   7.41 3 
Moldova 7.56 3 
Ghana 7.65 2 
Egypt 7.92 2 
Brazil 8.36 2 
Peru 8.59 2 
El Salvador  8.83 2 
Maldives 8.86 2 
Seychelles 8.93 2 
Costa Rica  9.08 2 
Mexico 9.10 2 
Mauritania 9.22 2 
Belarus 9.45 2 
Congo DR  9.53 2 
Belize 9.54 2 
Angola 9.82 2 
Uganda 9.91 2 
Nicaragua 10.12 2 
Serbia 10.59 2 
Haiti 11.01 2 
Georgia 11.39 2 
Mali 11.40 2 
Bangladesh 11.54 2 
Bhutan 11.66 2 
Turkey 11.75 2 
India 11.83 2 
Lesotho 12.24 1 
Lebanon 12.35 1 
Armenia 12.44 1 
Ethiopia 13.67 1 
Grenada 14.48 1 
Azerbaijan 14.77 1 
Burundi 15.14 1 
Turkmenistan 15.86 1   27
Myanmar 16.13 1 
Cape Verde  16.58 1 
Guinea-Bissau 17.00 1 
Laos   17.64 1 
Cambodia 18.21 1 
Mozambique 18.93 1 
Viet nam  19.64 1 
Albania 19.78 1 
Rwanda 20.03 1 
Zambia 20.89 1 
Sudan 22.48 1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  23.75 1 
China 24.26 1 
Chad 27.62 1 
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Table 1.2 Potential Demand for Aid for Trade: Quintile Ranking for 10 Measures 









































Albania 1  2  2  2 2 3 1 3  5 2 2.3
Algeria 4  1  1  2 4 4 1 1  5 5 2.8
Angola 2  1  1  2 5 ..  4 5  2 3 2.8
Argentina 3  5  3  3 1 2 2 1  1 1 2.2
Armenia 1  2  1  1 2 ..  5 4  4 5 2.8
Azerbaijan 1  1  3  1 5 2 3 5  3 5 2.9
Bangladesh 2  2  3  1 3 5 2 4  5 3 3.0
Belarus 2  1  1  1 1 3 2 2  1 1 1.5
Belize 2  3  5  4 4 ..  4 2  2 2 3.1
Benin 5  4  4  3 4 4 1 4  5 5 3.9
Bhutan 2  ..  1  1 3 ..  3 4  5 5 3.0
Bolivia 3  2  2  2 2 2 2 2  5 4 2.6
Bosnia and H.  1  ..  2  1 1 ..  1 2  3 3 1.8
Botswana 3  3  ..  ..  5 3 5 4  1 1 3.1
Brazil 2  1  3  2 1 3 2 1  2 1 1.8
Burkina Faso  3  3  5  1 5 4 1 5  4 5 3.6
Burundi 1  3  5  5 5 4 1 5  4 2 3.5
Cambodia 1  2  3  1 3 4 2 4  4 3 2.7
Cameroon 4  2  2  4 4 5 1 4  1 5 3.2
Cape Verde  1  3  1  2 4 ..  5 2  2 3 2.6
Central African R  5  4  4  4 4 5 1 5  5 5 4.2
Chad  1  2 5  1 .. ..  1 5  5 5 3.1
Chile 3  1  2  3 2 1 2 2  1 1 1.8
China 1  1  4  1 1 1 3 1  1 1 1.5
Colombia 4  4  2  4 2 4 2 4  4 3 3.3
Comoros 5  3  4  3 5 ..  5 3  3 2 3.7
Congo 4  2  1  3 5 ..  1 5  4 4 3.2
Costa Rica  2  2  3  4 2 2 3 3  2 2 2.5
Côte d'Ivoire  3  5  4  4 3 3 1 2  3 3 3.1
Croatia 3  2  3  3 1 1 4 3  3 2 2.5
Cuba ..  ..  4  5 3 ..  1 ..  ..  ..  3.3
Congo DR  2  5  3  5 4 ..  1 5  5 5 3.9
Djibouti 5  4  2  3 1 ..  1 2  5 5 3.1
Dominica 5  4  2  5 3 ..  4 1  1 1 2.9
Dominican Republic  4  5  3  4 2 ..  2 1  3 3 3.0
East  Timor  .. ..  ..  ..  3 .. ..  3  5 5 4.0
Ecuador 4  2  2  3 3 1 2 2  3 2 2.4
Egypt 2  1  1  2 2 2 3 2  4 5 2.4
El Salvador  2  3  3  5 1 2 5 2  2 2 2.7
Equatorial Guinea  1  1  1  1 5 ..  1 3  1 1 1.7
Eritrea 5  4  2  3 3 2 5 5  4 5 3.8
Ethiopia 1  2  5  4 4 5 1 5  4 5 3.6






































Gabon 5  5  1  5 5 5 1 1  3 2 3.3
Gambia 4  4  4  5 3 ..  ..  2  3 2 3.4
Georgia 2  2  1  1 1 ..  3 3  3 3 2.1
Ghana 2  2  5  3 3 4 2 3  5 3 3.2
Grenada 1  ..  2  5 3 ..  4 1  1 1 2.3
Guatemala 5  2  4  4 1 3 4 1  3 4 3.1
Guinea 5  5  4  4 4 5 1 4  2 2 3.6
Guinea-Bissau 1  3  5  5 5 ..  1 3  4 3 3.3
Guyana 5  4  5  4 3 5 4 3  5 5 4.3
Haiti 2  3  3  2 4 ..  ..  5  4 4 3.4
Honduras 4  4  3  5 2 3 3 1  2 2 2.9
India 2  1  3  2 1 5 3 3  1 1 2.2
Indonesia 3  5  2  4 1 1 3 2  1 1 2.3
Iran   3  1  1  4 5 5 5 3  2 2 3.1
Jamaica 5  5  3  5 4 ..  4 2  3 4 3.9
Jordan 4  4  4  1 1 3 2 2  1 1 2.3
Kazakhstan 4  1  1  1 4 1 3 5  5 5 3.0
Kenya 4  4  4  2 2 3 3 4  3 3 3.2
Kiribati ..  ..  5  1 5 .. 5 2  2 2 3.1
Korea,  DR  .. ..  1  4 1 .. ..  ..  ..  ..  2.0
Kyrgyzstan 5  3  1  5 3 1 3 5  4 4 3.4
Laos 1  3  3  2 2 ..  5 5  4 5 3.3
Lebanon 1  1  2  3 1 2 5 2  4 4 2.5
Lesotho 1  3  ..  ..  3 2 5 5  2 5 3.3
Liberia  .. ..  1  5 ..  .. ..  1  2 4 2.6
Libya ..  1  1  3 5 ..  4 ..  2 1 2.4
Madagascar 4  4  4  4 2 4 4 4  3 4 3.7
Malawi 5  4  5  3 4 5 2 5  3 4 4.0
Malaysia 3  5  3  3 1 1 5 1  1 1 2.4
Maldives 2  4  2  3 4 ..  3 2  2 2 2.7
Mali 2  2  5  3 5 4 1 5  4 5 3.6
Marshall  Is  .. ..  5  1 5 .. ..  2  2 2 2.8
Mauritania 2  3  5  2 5 3 1 4  2 3 3.0
Mauritius 4  5  3  4 3 1 5 1  5 3 3.4
Mayotte  ..  ..  .. ..  .. ..  3 ..  ..  ..  3.0
Mexico 2  1  2  2 1 1 3 1  2 1 1.6
Micronesia   ..  ..  5  5 5 ..  4 3  2 2 3.7
Moldova 3  4  2  3 2 1 5 4  4 5 3.3
Mongolia ..  2  1  3 3 1 2 5  5 5 3.0
Montenegro  ..  ..  .. ..  .. ..  4 1  3 3 2.8
Morocco 3  2  3  3 1 5 3 1  4 2 2.7
Mozambique 1  2  4  1 4 2 2 3  3 4 2.6
Myanmar 1  2  1  2 2 ..  4 ..  4 5 2.6
Namibia 4  4  ..  ..  2 4 5 3  4 5 3.9
Nepal 3  5  2  4 2 5 3 4  5 5 3.8
Nicaragua 2  2  2  4 2 2 3 4  4 5 3.0
Niger 4  4  1  5 3 4 1 5  5 5 3.7
Nigeria 4  1  1  4 5 4 3 4  3 3 3.2






































Palau ..  ..  4  1 4 ..  2 3  ..  ..  2.8
Panama 5  5  4  5 3 3 3 1  1 1 3.1
Papua New Guinea  5  5  1  4 3 1 5 3  5 5 3.7
Paraguay 5  5  5  4 3 2 2 4  4 2 3.6
Peru 2  1  2  2 2 2 1 2  1 1 1.6
Philippines 3  5  3  2 3 1 4 1  1 3 2.6
Rwanda 1  3  5  3 4 5 1 5  5 5 3.7
St Kitts and Nevis  3  ..  2  1 4 ..  4 1  1 1 2.1
Saint Lucia  4  4  5  5 4 ..  4 1  1 1 3.2
St Vincent and G  5  3  3  5 3 ..  4 1  ..  ..  3.4
Samoa  5 ..  5  2 5 ..  ..  3 ..  ..  4.0
Sao Tome and P.  ..  ..  3  5 5 ..  ..  3  2 3 3.5
Senegal 5  4  4  4 2 4 1 1  2 4 3.1
Serbia 2  ..  ..  ..  1 ..  4 1  3 3 2.3
Seychelles 2  3  4  1 5 ..  4 1  1 1 2.4
Sierra Leone  4  3  4  3 5 ..  5 4  5 5 4.2
Solomon Is  ..  4  5  2 5 ..  1 2  5 5 3.6
Somalia  .. ..  4  5 ..  .. ..  ..  2 5 4.0
South Africa  4  5  2  2 1 2 4 3  1 1 2.5
Sri Lanka  3  5  3  3 2 3 3 2  3 4 3.1
Sudan 1  1  4  5 4 5 4 5  3 2 3.4
Suriname ..  3  3  2 5 ..  1 3  2 2 2.6
Swaziland 4  3  ..  ..  3 2 5 2  3 3 3.1
Syria 3  3  1  5 4 ..  5 3  4 5 3.7
Tajikistan 3  ..  5  1 4 ..  3 5  5 5 3.9
Tanzania 3  3  4  4 2 3 2 3  4 5 3.3
Thailand 3  5  3  2 1 3 4 2  1 1 2.5
Macedonia 3  3  2  3 1 ..  5 3  5 3 3.1
Togo 4  4  5  2 2 4 1 3  4 3 3.2
Tonga ..  ..  5  3 4 ..  5 1  2 2 3.1
Tunisia 4  5  2  2 1 5 4 1  1 1 2.6
Turkey 2  1  3  3 1 1 5 1  1 1 1.9
Turkmenistan 1  ..  3  1 4 .. 5 ..  ..  ..  2.8
Uganda 2  4  5  5 3 3 2 4  3 3 3.4
Ukraine 4  1  2  2 1 1 5 4  3 2 2.5
Uruguay 3  5  4  2 1 2 2 2  3 2 2.6
Uzbekistan 4  5  5  1 3 ..  2 5  5 5 3.9
Vanuatu 5  4  5  1 4 ..  3 3  2 3 3.3
Venezuela 5  1  1  5 5 3 1 4  2 1 2.8
Viet Nam  1  1  2  1 2 ..  4 2  1 2 1.8
Yemen 5  2  1  5 5 ..  3 4  4 4 3.7
Zambia 1  2  5  4 4 3 1 5  4 5 3.4
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Annex 2 The dimensions of the Aid for Trade potential demand: indicators and 
sources. 
 
Table 2.1 Indicators used in this analysis and related sources  
 
Dimension  Indicator   Source 
 
Trade performance 
Real growth of exports of goods and services  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Change in export market share of goods and 
services  
World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Competitiveness effect (change in market share)  International Trade Center, Trade 
Performance Indicators 
Demand effect (change in market share)  International Trade Center, Trade 
Performance Indicators 
Index of export concentration (Herfindhal)  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Capacity 
                  Incentives 
Trade restrictiveness Index (tariffs only)  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Share of tariff lines with domestic peaks  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
                  Infrastructure  LPI Quality of Transport and IT  World Bank, LPI Indicators 
 
                  Institutions 
Efficiency of customs  World Bank, LPI Indicators 




Table 2.2 Other potential indicators and related sources  
 
 
Dimension  Indicator   Source 
Trade performance  FDI Inflows (as % of GDP)  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Real Growth in Total Trade (%)  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Number of product exported/imported   World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
                   
Capacity 
 
                   Incentives 
Share of Tariff Lines with MFN-0 (%)  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Share of Tariff Lines Bound (%)  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Tariff Overhang (%)  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
Applied Tariff Escalation  World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
GATS Commitments Index   World Bank , World Trade Indicator 
 
 
                  Infrastructure 
Number of internet users, mobile phone and fixed 
phone subscribers for 1000 inhabitants  
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
Percentage of paved road, total km of rail lines, air 
transport freight costs to US 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 
Quality of port and water infrastructure  IMD, Global competitiveness Report 
 
                   Institutions 
Ease and affordability of arranging international 
shipments. 
World Bank, LPI Indicators 
Domestic logistics costs  World Bank, LPI Indicators 
Timeliness of shipments in reaching destination.  World Bank, LPI Indicators 














Annex 3.1: Gravity regression. 
This annex describes the technical justification for the gravity model analysis in section. It 
describes the datasets, the variables, the sources and the methodology. 
 
Cross-section year 2006  
 
Dependent Variable:  log of imports from developing countries.  
 
Independent variables: 
-  log of GDP of the importing and exporting country (source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators) 
-  FTA: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when exporting and importing 
country has a free trade area in place. (source: World Bank, , World Trade 
Indicators) 
-  Both wto: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when both the exporting and 
importing country are WTO members(source: World Trade Organization website 
as of July 2008) 
-  Common border: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the exporting and 
importing country share a border (source:  Cepii  database) 
-  Colonial relationship: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when one of the two 
trading partner were a colony of the other trading partner (source:  Cepii  database) 
-  Common language: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the exporting 
and importing country have the same official language (source:  Cepii  database) 
-  Log distance: distance between the capital cities of the exporting and importing 
countries (source:  Cepii  database) 
-  Log export tariff peak: log of the exporter’s share of tariff lines with domestic tariff 
peak (source: World Bank, , World Trade Indicators) 
-  Log remoteness imp and exp: log of the product of the exporter and importer 
remoteness variable. The remoteness represents the weighted sum of the partners’ 
share of GDP over world GDP weighted by the distance. 
-  Contract enforcement imp and exp: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when 
both the exporter and importer need above average time and procedure to enforce a 
contract (source: World Bank, Doing Business database) 
-   Exp. Eff customs/ imp. Eff. Customs: LPI , efficiency of customs for respectively 
the exporter and importer (source: World Bank, LPI database) 
-  Exp. quality of transp. and IT/ imp. quality of transp. and IT: LPI quality of 
transport and IT for respectively the exporter and importer (source: World Bank, 
LPI database) 
-  Log time to export/ log time to import: the time required for complete all the 
procedure needed to export/ import a standardized cargo of goods by ocean 
transport (source: World Bank, Doing Business database). 
-  Log exp. quality of comm./ log imp. quality of comm.: the simple average of the 
number of internet users, fixed phone and mobile subscribers per 1000 inhabitants. 
The average is taken after normalization of the variables. The normalization 
consists in dividing each variable by the sample mean such that the mean equals one 
for every variable (source: World Bank, World Development Indicators).   33
-   Log (1+TTRI overall) of the exporter: the log of one plus the overall trade 
restrictiveness index that include only tariffs. Tariffs taken into account include 
preferential tariff (source:World Trade Indicators, 2008).  
-  Log (1+TTRI) bilateral: the log of one plus the bilateral trade restrictiveness index 
(only tariffs) that the exporter faces. Tariffs taken into account include preferential 
tariff (source: Hoekman and Nicita, 2008). Since the variable is constructing using 
also preferential tariff, the FTA and the WTO variables were omitted from the 
regression.  
Methodology: Heckman ML. The excluded variable from the second stage is the 
contract enforcement of importer and exporter. The methodology allows to deal with 
the presence of zeros and it has been shown to produce unbiased estimates (see Congo 
and Martin, 2008). The marginal effects represented in Table 1 have been calculated at 
the mean and represents the expected value of the independent variable given a one unit 





  log import  Prob 
(import>0) 
log import  Prob 
(import>0) 
log import  Prob 
(import>0) 
log import  Prob 
(import>0) 
Constant  -60.993***  -16.765***  -57.236***  -16.630***  -60.622***  -14.163***  -69.869***  -14.365*** 
log exp. GDP  1.179***  0.182***  1.098***  0.179***  1.325***  0.182***  1.332***  0.197*** 
log imp. GDP  1.010***  0.355***  0.976***  0.357***  1.061***  0.404***  1.087***  0.298*** 
Fta  0.237*  0.023  0.165  0.027  0.268**  0.036  0.371***  0.12 
Bothwto  0.225**  0.345***  0.065  0.336***  0.144  0.316***  0.327***  0.339*** 
common border  0.855***  -0.089  0.860***  -0.092  0.774***  -0.08  0.695***  -0.073 
Colonial 
relationship 
0.528*  0.075  0.525*  0.09  0.657**  0.09  0.705**  0.009 
common language  0.923***  0.398***  0.945***  0.418***  0.743***  0.347***  0.801***  0.472*** 
log distance  -1.408***  -0.192***  -1.407***  -0.186***  -1.468***  -0.212***  -1.412***  -0.193*** 
log exp. Tariff 
peack 
-0.158***  -0.039***  -0.107***  -0.034***  -0.086***  -0.042***  -0.089***  -0.045*** 
log remoteness 
imp. and exp. 
1.238***  0.229**  1.199***  0.242***  1.614***  0.243***  1.843***  0.280*** 
contract enforce. 
imp. and exp. 
  -0.282***    -0.305***    -0.265***    -0.142** 
exp. eff. Of 
customs 
1.942***  0.172**             
imp. eff. Of 
customs 
0.556***  0.610***             
exp. quality of 
transp. and IT 
    1.931***  0.142*         
imp. quality of 
transp. and IT 
    0.571***  0.502***         
log time to export          -0.913***  -0.216***     
log time to import          -0.407***  -0.344***     
log exp. Quality of 
comm. 
            0.328***  0.063*** 
log imp. Quality of 
comm. 
            0.106**  0.361*** 
Observations:6783                 

















section 2006              
  
 Heckman ML 
   log import 
Prob 
(import>0)  log import 
Prob 
(import>0)  log import 
Prob 
(import>0)  log import 
Prob 
(import>0) 
log exp. GDP  1.154***  0.040*  1.084***  0.044*  1.321***  0.037*  1.342***  0.026 
log imp. GDP  1.004***  0.084***  0.959***  0.066**  1.045***  0.157***  1.095***  0.105*** 
log (1+TTRI ) 
bilateral  -2.133***  -1.045***  -1.923***  -1.019***  -2.116***  -0.869***  -2.564***  -0.636** 
common border  0.935***  0.137  0.952***  0.11  0.870***  0.165  0.810***  0.279 
colonial relationship  0.604**  0.197  0.592**  0.226  0.741***  0.244  0.756***  0.1 
common language  0.750***  0.347***  0.761***  0.374***  0.557***  0.384***  0.663***  0.461*** 
log distance  -1.436***  -0.016  -1.418***  -0.012  -1.496***  -0.012  -1.453***  -0.017 
log remoteness 
imp. and exp.  1.391***  0.658***  1.311***  0.665***  1.783***  0.628***  1.987***  0.803*** 
contract enforc. 
imp. and exp.     -0.426***     -0.419***     -0.369***     -0.303*** 
Constant  -62.312***  -14.615***  -57.996***  -13.952***  -62.052*** -10.919***  -71.807***  -14.507*** 
log exp. tariff peak  -0.178***  0.025  -0.120***  0.022  -0.100***  0.02  -0.093***  -0.001 
exp. eff. of customs  2.062***  -0.059                   
imp. eff. of customs  0.537***  1.060***                   
exp. quality of 
transp. and IT        1.940***  -0.07             
imp. quality of 
transp. and IT        0.587***  0.853***             
log time to export              -0.940***  0.003       
log time to import              -0.454***  -0.758***       
log exp. quality of 
comm.                    0.257***  0.094** 
log imp. quality of 
comm.                    0.097**  0.408*** 
Observations: 4221 

























Gravity cross-section 2006      
  
 Heckman ML 















log exp. GDP  1.210***  0.055***  1.105***  0.051**  1.309***  0.047**  1.337***  0.029 
log imp. GDP  1.038***  0.088***  1.000***  0.069***  1.074***  0.156***  1.131***  0.124*** 
common border  1.192***  0.212  1.223***  0.207  1.118***  0.231  1.060***  0.312 
1 for pairs ever in colonial 
relationship  0.510**  0.205  0.460*  0.212  0.604**  0.207  0.614**  0.174 
log (1+TTRI) bilateral  -1.604***  -1.186***  -1.512***  -1.103***  -1.560***  -0.824***  -2.171***  -0.657** 
log (1+TTRI) exporter 
overall  -2.716***  0.305  -2.751***  0.382  -2.217***  0.44  -1.835**  1.658** 
common language  0.878***  0.170*  0.938***  0.193**  0.756***  0.183**  0.825***  0.224** 
log distance  -1.410***  -0.078*  -1.395***  -0.075  -1.460***  -0.093*  -1.424***  -0.086* 
log remoteness imp. and 
exp.  1.382***  0.734***  1.287***  0.731***  1.776***  0.695***  1.895***  0.891*** 







contract enforc. imp. and 
exp.     -0.465***     -0.474***     -0.404***     -0.386*** 
exp. eff. of customs  1.451***  -0.049                   
imp. eff. of customs  0.485***  1.002***                   
exp. quality of transp. and IT        1.699***  -0.013             
imp. quality of transp. and IT        0.533***  0.828***             
log time to export              -0.855***  -0.05       
log time to import              -0.412***  -0.754***       
log exp. quality of comm.                    0.169***  0.111*** 
log imp. quality of comm.                    0.064  0.355*** 
Observations: 5011 





















language ln dist 
w t o   1              
ln gdp exp  0.0345  1              
ln gdp imp  0.0622  -0.0861 1            
contiguity 0.0085  0.0392 -0.0284 1          
colony 0.0311  0.0088 0.1319 0.0788 1        
dummy contract 
enforcement 0.0029  0.0486 -0.0881 0.0527 -0.0355 1      
fta 0.0316  0.056 0.0517 0.2707 0.0669 -0.0332  1    
common language  0.0544  -0.0836 -0.0583 0.1686 0.1475 -0.0081  0.2137 1  
ln dist  0.0974  0.0764 0.0829 -0.4024 -0.0684 0.0116 -0.5156 -0.3157 1
ln share of tariff peak  -0.0843  0.2216 -0.0044 -0.0175 0.0289 0.0681 0.0628 0.0267 -0.0437
ln Ri Rj  0.2503  0.0268 -0.0746 0.0681 -0.041 0.0893 -0.0721 0.1965 0.3122
lpi transport and IT imp  0.1798  -0.0667 0.7829 -0.0689 0.1137 -0.1163 0.0807 -0.0644 0.0679
lpi transport and IT exp  0.1722  0.6709 -0.071 0.0299 0.0146 0.1115 0.0781 -0.0492 0.0853
lpi efficiency customs 
imp 0.1794  -0.0635 0.7242 -0.0729 0.0993 -0.1185 0.08 -0.0523 0.0675
lpi efficiency customs 
exp 0.1377  0.5768 -0.0623 0.0203 0.0217 0.0757 0.075 -0.049 0.0577
ln time to export  -0.2006  -0.3203 0.0535 -0.0065 -0.0193 0.0185 -0.0572 -0.0356 -0.0983
ln time to import  -0.1846  0.049 -0.5733 0.0768 -0.0715 0.1507 -0.0822 0.056 -0.0578
ln communication exp  -0.0949  0.3865 -0.0363 -0.0042 -0.0015 -0.0294 0.084 -0.0612 -0.0125
ln communication imp  0.0969  -0.0637 0.6326 -0.0741 0.0885 -0.1586 0.037 -0.094 0.0608
ln bilateral OTRI   -0.0284  -0.0147 -0.2337 0.0147 -0.0681 0.0434 -0.0709 0.0317 0.0243







































               
ln share of tariff peak  1                 
ln Ri Rj  -0.0982  1              
lpi transport and IT imp  0.0012  -0.0903 1            
lpi transport and IT exp  0.2993  0.1499 -0.0596 1          
lpi efficiency customs 
imp  -0.001  -0.0817 0.9661 -0.0574 1      
lpi efficiency customs 
exp  0.3962  0.0925 -0.0525 0.9151 -0.0521 1     
ln time to export  -0.319  -0.0997 0.0423 -0.4895 0.042 -0.4705  1    
ln time to import  0.0016  0.0688 -0.8351 0.0436 -0.8198 0.0391  -0.0312 1  
ln communication exp  0.3727  -0.1902 -0.0246 0.4196 -0.026 0.4059 -0.4614 0.0161 1
ln communication imp  -0.0013  -0.0503 0.7445 -0.0542 0.701 -0.0471 0.0399 -0.7393 -0.0129
ln bilateral OTRI   -0.0506  0.0662 -0.3525 -0.0002 -0.3529 -0.0022 -0.034 0.3588 -0.035













      
ln communication 
imp 1     
ln bilateral OTRI   -0.3589  1  
ln overall OTRI exp  -0.0188  0.0401 1  38
ANNEX 3.2: Aid for Trade regressions.  
Dependent variable: Log of Aid for Trade per GDP. 2006 Cross-sections. 
Sources: OECD, CRS database; World Bank, Development Indicators; World Bank, 
Governance database; World Bank, LPI indicators; World Bank, World Trade 
Indicators.  
The variable score represents the average of the scores along the ten dimensions. 
 
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)  -1.363817*** 
rule of law  1.080166*** 
Score 0.8554585*** 
Constant -11.22878** 
Observation:123    
R2:0.5    
 
Excluding oil and gas  
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp)  
ln(gdp per capita)  -1.338082*** 




R2: 0.48   
 
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)  -1.326421* 
rule of law   0.8289707* 
ln(change in market share)  -94.41791* 
ln(share of tariff peak)  -0.1712095* 
LPI overall  -1.890653* 
Constant  -4.821496* 
R2:0.6    
Observation:96    
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)  -1.373421*** 
rule of law   0 .9275543*** 
ln(structural)   28.06872 
ln(share of tariff peak)  -0.1863482 ** 
LPI overall   -1.737118*** 
Constant   -4.861803*** 
R2:0.56    




Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)  -1.355803*** 
rule of law   0.8748965*** 
ln(competitiveness)   -142.6534 *** 
ln(share of tariff peak)   -0.165482 *** 
LPI overall   -1.868199*** 
Constant   -4.616997 *** 
R2:0.6    
Observation:96    
 
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)   -1.370607*** 
rule of law   0.8948869*** 
ln(exports growth)   -.0896575  
ln(share of tariff peak)  -0.1906822 ** 
LPI overall    -1.774352*** 
Constant  -4.940824*** 
R2:0.56    
Observation:96    
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)   -1.375557*** 
rule of law   0.8748965*** 
ln(competitiveness)  -133.5647*** 
ln(share of tariff peak)   -0.201531*** 
LPI efficiency of customs  -1.912417*** 
Constant   -4.710891*** 
R2:0.6    
Observation:96    
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)  -1.387817*** 
rule of law   1.000047*** 
ln(structural)   52.51919 
ln(share of tariff peak)   -0.2166517 ** 
LPI efficiency of customs  -1.840815*** 
Constant   -4.92939*** 
R2:0.56    
Observation:96      39
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)   -1.386041*** 
rule of law  0 .9654638*** 
ln(exports growth)   -0.0869886 
ln(share of tariff peak)  -0.2243122** 
LPI efficiency of customs    -1.774352*** 
Constant   -4.934992*** 
R2:0.56    
Observation:96    
 
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)   -1.246785*** 
rule of law  0 .8376146*** 
ln(change in market share)   -94.84804*** 
ln(share of tariff peak)   -0.1521243*** 
LPI quality of transport and IT  -1.962895*** 
Constant   -5.630799*** 
R2:0.6    
Observation:96    
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)  -1.297809*** 
rule of law   .9402534*** 
ln(structural)  35.3686  
ln(share of tariff peak)   -0.1677107**
LPI quality of transport and IT  -1.840815*** 
Constant   -5.576076*** 
R2:0.57    



















Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)   - 1.278681* 
rule of law  0.8834856* 
ln(competitiveness)   -141.1076* 
ln(share of tariff peak)   -0.147153* 
LPI quality of transport and IT  -1.931031* 
Constant  -5.425227* 
R2:0.6    
Observation:96    
 
Dependent variable ln(aft/gdp) 
ln(gdp per capita)   -1.292514*** 
rule of law  0.9020632*** 
ln(exports growth)   -0.0990229  
ln(share of tariff peak)   -0.1727595** 
LPI quality of transport and IT   -1.843541*** 
Constant  -5.743073* 
R2:0.56    
















Dependent variable: ln aid for trade on gdp                  
Fixed effects    
ln gdp per capita   -0.862*** 
coc_est    0.542**    




Number of obs:  1060  
* , **, *** denotes significance respectively at 1%, at 5%, at 10%  




Dependent variable: ln aid for trade on gdp                  
Fixed effects    
ln gdp per capita    -0.980*** 
trade cpia   0.123* 
Ln(1+share of domestic tariff peak)   -0.430 
ln(exportgrowth)   0.043 
lninfrastructure   0.947* 
constant -12.937*** 
Number of obs: 1087 
* , **, *** denotes significance respectively at 1%, at 5%, at 10%  
R2 overall: 0.26 
Dependent variable: ln aid for trade on gdp                  
Fixed effects  first stage 
ln gdp per capita     -0.882*** 
rol_est 0.187 
Ln(1+share of domestic tariff peak)   -0.073 
ln(exportgrowth) 0.333 
lninfrastructure   1.074** 
constant -13.237*** 
Number of obs:  1102  
* , **, *** denotes significance respectively at 1%, at 5%, at 
10%  
R2 overall: 0.2306 
 Annex 3.3: decomposition of change in market share. 






 be the market share of export of country i to the world in times t, and let j defines 
the importing country while k the sector, then the total change in market shares between 

















































































































































The first element represents the competitiveness effect and is given by the multiplication 
between the change in market share in import markets and the initial share of import markets 
in world imports. The second element represents the structural effect of initial geographic 
specialization and is given by the multiplication of the change in the partner imports in world 
imports and the exporter initial market share in the partner imports.    
The third elements represents the structural effect of initial sector specialization and is given 
by the multiplication between a first term, which represents the difference of the exporter 
market share in import market and the position of the exporters in the importer markets at 
time zero, and the change of the partner position on world imports. 
The sum of the second and third elements represents the total structural effect.  
The last term, called the adaptation effect, represent the multiplication of the competitive and 
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time 1       
herfindhal 0.585  1     
TTRI 0.301  0.3885  1   
peak -0.247  -0.4327  -0.42  1  
structural 0.208  0.1524  0.297  -0.3 1  
competitiveness 0.123  0.22  0.185  0.03 0.0228 1  
custom 0.475  0.3657  0.21  -0.2 0.0718 0.0991 1  
realgrowth -0.056  0.0651  0.072  0.06 -0.1719 0.316 0.0346 1 
change in 
market share  -0.092  -0.0934  0.075  0.05 0.24 0.2773 -0.031 0.484  1
transport 0.532  0.4549  0.206  -0.1 0.1007 0.0933 0.7253 0.0805  -0.0001 1
 
 